Trinity Mirror

Ad revenue recovery: Different strokes for different folks

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 13 August 2010 at 14:25
Tags: Associated Newspapers, Daily Mail & General Trust, ITV, Johnston Press, Northcliffe Media, Reed Elsevier, Trinity Mirror

The recovery is starting to remind me of the Tour De France. High on a mountain ridge, the peloton is stretched out along a vast stretch of road. But two groups are visible. The leaders represent consumer-facing mass media — the broadcasters and national press. The laggards come from B2B publishing and local newspapers. Worryingly, at this stage during a recovery, the latter should be doing far better than they are now. At local newspapers, advertising revenues are still declining.

And the mountain ridge? This represents the risk of a double-dip recession, which now seems to concern many analysts, despite contrary indications.

Consumer media: Q2 advertising revenues

Consumer confidence reached a nadir in early 2009, began to climb and reached a peak in April of this year. Since the election, it’s been falling. Few analysts now expect interest rates to increase soon. The notion of a double dip is no longer a dark, if marginal, fantasy. It’s closer to the mainstream of economic forecasting than at any time during the past two years.

As yet, ad revenues at major media organizations aren’t showing any side effects. Q2 wasn’t wobbly: it was strong. Marketers haven’t yet drawn in their horns, although that could change very rapidly.

Recent weeks have seen a flurry of half-year results and trading updates. DMGT released a trading statement in late July. Here, the trick was to look for the underlying numbers, which strip out the effect of disposals (like the Evening Standard).

At Associated, these advertising numbers confirmed the general pattern we’ve come to expect. The Mail had turned in 15% ad revenue increases during January and March — but less for February. The 15% rise in Q2 looked like continuing solid progress.

Digital revenues were up by 46% at Associated. This isn’t quite the 100% YOY increase that Alan Rusbridger of The Guardian claims to have seen during April. Yet fairly clearly, it’s getting to the point where last year’s online revenue declines are starting to look like a distant memory.

ITV’s half-yearly report suggested ad revenues had risen by 18% during 1H, compared with 15% for the broadcast market generally. These numbers closely resemble those from Associated Newspapers. Although ITV was early to recover and is still growing faster than the market, agencies move in lockstep.

Robust growth like this isn’t universal. At Trinity Mirror, ad revenues in the tabloids increased by a mere 2.2% during 1H. The company predicted flat ad revenues for July. At Trinity’s nationals, digital advertising was similarly subdued, rising by just 4% YOY. You’d have to suspect that chief executive Sly Bailey is examining both the reasons for these oddly muted numbers as well as ways to spur more growth.

Local & business media: advertising revenues

This bit of the peloton contains all sorts. Toward the head of the group are B2B publishers like Centaur Media. It’ll be September before we get Centaur’s full-year results (to 30 June). But the company recently suggested that ad revenues rose by 10% during 1H. For the record, that’s better than Trinity Mirror’s tabloids, where ad revenues only rose by 2%. On this basis, Centaur is up there with the leaders.

Yet a big distance separates Centaur Media from the likes of Reed Business Information. Stripping out the effect of closures and disposals, RBI’s like-for-like ad revenues during 1H declined by 4%. Here, management was content to suggest that the rate of decline in ad revenues has “moderated”.

This puts RBI on a par with what’s happening in local newspapers. Here, too, revenues are still declining, not quite bumping along the bottom. At Northcliffe, for example, underlying revenues were down by 4% during Q2 — the same as Q1’s decline.

If retail has powered ad recovery at the nationals, its relative weakness in local newspapers is worrying. Retail advertising declined by 6% at Northcliffe during 1H. Digital only rose by 10%. The fact that property ads — up by 9% — were one of the few bright spots isn’t exactly comforting.

Trinity Mirror’s local newspapers mirrored Northcliffe’s. During 1H, after stripping out revenue from titles recently acquired from Guardian Media Group, they saw revenues fall by 5%.

The bullish case runs like this: local newspapers are taking longer than expected to recover, but improvement is visible. Last year, after all, Trinity’s local newspapers saw revenues decline by 12.4%. The bearish case is pretty obvious. If a double-dip recession is coming, it seems likely that local newspapers won’t return to YOY growth before it arrives.

Ad revenues, for most media owners, wax and wane far more dramatically than circulation revenues. As a result, it’s ad revenues that tend to define the industry’s mood — as well as the ease with which it can make profits. Typically, too, the distance between the fortunate and the unfortunate always widens at economic turning points.

As a result, life at ITV and Associated Newspapers currently feels very different from existence at Johnston Press and Reed Business Information. The distance between winners and losers will probably contract if a double-dip recession takes hold. But it could expand further, too.

Retailers & national newspapers: Too big to fail?

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 11 August 2010 at 12:43
Tags: Associated Newspapers, Daily Mail & General Trust, Media, News International, Trinity Mirror

Is the advertising recovery we’re witnessing as unbalanced as anything that occurred in the City of London during the run-up to 2008?

That’s what I’m starting to wonder. Take DMGT’s Q2 numbers, which disclose that retailers once again outperformed the broad advertising market, increasing their expenditure Associated Newspapers by 19% YOY. Overall, ad revenues at Associated climbed by 15% during Q2.

At Associated, retail is almost certainly the largest vertical sector in terms of ad revenues — bigger than cars, telecoms and IT or financial services. Anecdotal evidence suggests that retailers have become similarly important at Trinity Mirror’s nationals and The Sun.

The slide at the top of this post, taken from a recent presentation by Guy Zitter, the MD of Mail Newspapers, shows that retailers bought roughly £80m-worth of display advertising from The Mail and Mail On Sunday last year. This year, the retailers’ contribution could rise to £100m. This represents a big proportion — perhaps one-third — of the display ad revenue generated by Zitter’s newspapers.

Drill down a little deeper, and you find that almost half of Mail Newspapers’ retail advertising — nearly £40m-worth of it last year — came from supermarkets. Remarkably, the supermarket have more than trebled their expenditure at DMGT during the past five years.

A few obvious questions, then. What is propelling this huge expansion in retail advertising? Food price inflation? The simple fact of intense commercial rivalry? Or is press advertising itself a bargain that retailers crave to consume? (Perhaps it’s not the latter: Zitter’s presentation also proudly points out that the Mail and Mail On Sunday have been increasing revenue per page at a rapidly increasing rate — well beyond the rate of inflation — for at least the past decade.)

Moreover, the supermarkets have behaved like no other sector during the recession. Unlike everyone else, they continued to spend more and more on press advertising. (Other retailers, by contrast, slackened off a bit, but certainly didn’t hit the breaks in panic mode.) Among the nationals, the supermarkets’ behaviour put a floor under the worst effects of recession, blunting its impact.

In the end, the really important question for publishers is how much longer the big retail chains will be able to increase their expenditure at this rate.

No-one knows. And therein lies the problem. If the supermarkets’ priorities change in the context of a double dip recession, or for any other reason, things could very rapidly start to look ugly for the national press.

Look further ahead, and a bigger challenge looms. Most retail advertising is tactical, price-based, stuff designed to pull shoppers through the doors. When it comes to this kind of advertising, the web hasn’t dealt a death blow to newspapers. Quite the opposite, in fact.

But mobile advertising could be a very different proposition. Geolocation-based offers that appear on shoppers’ handsets as they wander down the High Street, or in advance of a planned shopping trip, won’t spell the end of newsprint. But they will hit newspapers where it hurts.

Stop the presses #2: A long way to the all-digital future

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 26 May 2010 at 14:45
Tags: Associated Newspapers, Daily Mail & General Trust, Guardian Media Group, News International, Telegraph Media Group, Trinity Mirror

To say the least, the notion of “switching off the presses” is simplistic. There will be complicating factors we can only vaguely imagine. Here are a few that might emerge:

1) Print could generate profits after digital revenue streams mature

Fickle investors who buy shares in the likes of DMGT, News Corp and Trinity Mirror on the public markets will see no reason to halt print production if it remains significantly profitable.

As others go digital-only, quoted groups may hang around, mopping up the last print-based profits. As competition declines, these could prove hard to resist.

The risk, of course, is that these businesses begin to resemble Big Media’s very own rustbelt. The last men and women standing will need to be dedicated to cost-cutting. They will continue to feel the old urge to protect print at the expense of digital.

2) A two-speed national news market?

Focusing 100% on the digital future as soon as possible has its attractions. Pushing all of your resources and talent in one direction could produce impressive results. A big gulf could open up between digital-only and print/digital publishers.

Privately-held operations like Guardian and the Telegraph Media Group may find themselves free to dive headlong into a digital-only future.

3) Are conservative readers more resistant to change than liberal readers?

Some readers will never be ready for the end of print. But does the Daily Mail (for example) attract more late adopters to its ranks than the Guardian?

Logic suggests that liberals are just as likely to resist the passing of the old medium as conservatives. But the Mail’s editorial campaigning against most (all?) things digital suggests that it believes anti-digital sentiment runs deep among its readers.

Demographic trends might encourage some publishers to hold on to print for longer than others. The Sun still sells around 2m copies a day. . .

4) Print as a break-even platform dedicated to marketing the brand

Some publishers may choose to maintain dwindling print editions as a marketing tool, to promote their brands and drive readers to digital sites. For this reason, too, the death of print may be a lingering affair.

5) The ultimate mopping up operation: print editions go free

The experience of the Evening Standard suggests that free distribution could become the ultimate means of extending the lifespan of the nationals’ print editions.

The infrastructure required to distribute in huge numbers will be daunting. So will the costs. But you’d have to bet that someone will try. The Independent could become a test bed for bigger future efforts.

6) What happens to the huge build-out of print capacity?

Good question. In the run up to 2008, News International spent £650m on huge new printing facilities in Broxbourne. John Witherow of the Sunday Times suggests that these presses “were supposed to last 30 or 40 years” (ie: until 2048).

News International spent big. But lots of its rivals invested in new print plants at around the same time.

It’s too early to argue convincingly that these investments represent an industry-wide miscalculation of strategic proportions.

But what does lots of spare capacity suggest? All other things being equal, it suggests that the cost of printing newspapers, on an outsourced basis, at places like Broxbourne, can only decline. This may represent good news for local newspapers who contract out their printing to vast print plants owned by others.

Alternatively, all of that spare capacity might be dedicated to printing huge runs of a few free national newspapers.

There will be plenty of twists and turns on the road to an all-digital future. Yes, a few broadsheets might switch off the presses by 2015 or 2020 or even 2025. But their exit from the market will open up opportunity for others. Taken as a whole, the transition from print to digital still looks like a lengthy affair.

Up, down & sideways: Boom time at The Sun, stability at Trinity Mirror and cuts at The Times

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 13 May 2010 at 17:36
Tags: Johnston Press, News Corp, Times Media, Trinity Mirror

So Sly Bailey’s regionals experienced an 8% decline in ad revenues between January and early May. This mirrors the 7.1% decline at Johnston Press over the same time period.

There was no forecast of a return to growth among the regionals in this morning’s trading statement from Trinity Mirror. Management expects “month-on-month volatility” to continue across the company.

Turn to the company’s nationals, however, and things get interesting. The language here was muted, almost downbeat. Ad revenues are “flat” and “relatively stable”: up 1% in January-February, but down 1% in March-April. Circulation revenue fell by 6% across the period.

This feels like a marked contrast with News Corporation, which unveiled its quarterly results last week.

News Corp reported a 10% YOY increase in ad revenues at Wapping during Q1. During the conference call, James Quinn, the Telegraph’s US business editor, got a word in edgeways with Murdoch about this.

Q: “Any sign that the 10% increase will be sustained?”

A: “At the moment, every sign. We’ve had many weeks when the London Sun has had all-time records in revenues. I’ve got to say I’m surprised. But it’s very welcome.

A: Are there specific titles? Is it all display?

A: It’s all display, yes.

Q: Just the Sun or is it across all four papers?

A: The Sun has been the leader, but across the four papers, we’re up.

The contrast in tone with Trinity Mirror is stark. And yes, something interesting does seem to be going on at The Sun. In early April, Media Week described ad sales for the Easter period as follows:

Among trading highlights for the week are a 50% year-on-year increase in spend from the big four supermarket retailers as they focus on Easter dining as well as their expansion into new categories such as electrical and gaming.

Among the biggest spenders for The Sun, in a sector reported to be up 50% up year on year, are B&Q, DFS, Argos, Wickes and Furniture Village.

Perhaps a fleeting 50% increase on top of last year’s collapse isn’t much to write home about. But Murdoch did seen genuinely surprised — his word, not mine — about The Sun’s ability to break “all-time records” in terms of revenues in such a weak market.

Note, too, those final few words, in which Murdoch suggests that trading is up YOY “across” The Sun, News Of The World, The Times and the Sunday Times.

At the Telegraph, James Quinn interpreted this to mean that each of these newspapers is doing better than it was last year.

It would be churlish to suggest otherwise. But if The Sun really is soaring away into the upper atmosphere, what’s happening at The Times and The Sunday Times?

You have to wonder. In Scotland, the Sunday Times has axed its marketing team. By one account, 16 out of 20 journalists could be let go. There’s a suggestion that the Scottish edition will now be produced “from England, with regionalised pages”.

Today, we got the main act: a 10% cut in editorial budgets that could cost 80 jobs at the Times and the Sunday Times in London.

When it comes to cuts like these, one quarter’s trading performance is neither here nor there.

Like HM Government, Times Newspapers Ltd is trying to cut its structural deficit. In the year to June 2009, pre-tax losses came in at £87.7m, up from £50.2m the previous year.

Perhaps management is taking action before News Corp’s shareholders rise up to demand it. In any event, the logic seems remorseless. Two years ago, Wapping offloaded 100 out of 450 sales staff after merging its tabloid and broadsheet advertising teams. Here’s how Harding describes thinking at the moment:

our losses are unsustainable. We cannot ensure the long-term future of this paper and our futures in journalism if we cannot make a viable business out of The Times.

Up, down and sideways. The good news at The Sun and ITV (ad revenues up by 8% during Q1) is balanced out by the bad news elsewhere.

The IPA’s recent Bellwether Report suggested that media budgets rose during Q1. The last time this happened was Q307, two and a half years ago.

But note that only 21% of marketing bosses increased their total spend during the quarter. As yet, the recovery is patchy and weak. It’s not hard to imagine a pull-back.

At Trinity Mirror’s nationals, the worst recession in living memory feels like a blip

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 4 March 2010 at 13:08
Tags: Associated Newspapers, News International, Trinity Mirror

Some news organisations have had a half-decent recession. Trinity Mirror’s nationals rank among them.

This morning, Trinity Mirror released its final results for the year to December 2009. Ad revenues at the Daily Mirror and its stablemates fell by 8% during 2009. That’s far less than the chunky double-digit percentage declines that afflicted many broadsheets.

But at tabloids like the Mirror, circulation is more important than advertising. At Trinity Mirror’s nationals, for example, circulation comprises almost two-thirds of overall revenues. During 2009, these revenues held steady at the Mirror and its stablemates, declining by a mere 0.5%.

Add it all up, and Trinity Mirror’s nationals have emerged relatively unscathed from the worst recession in living memory. Overall, revenues declined by just 3.2% YOY to £460m. On the bottom line, operating margins were barely disturbed. In 2009, these declined to 18.2% from 18.7% during the previous year.

It’s hard to call this a recession: it feels more like a blip.

Sly Bailey and her management team will feel good about this performance. The comparison with the Mail and the Mail On Sunday is suggestive.

At Associated Newspapers, home to the Mail and the Mail On Sunday, like-for-like ad revenues fell by 15% during the year to October 2009, and then by a further 11% during Q409. Although it’s hard to make a direct comparison, circulation revenues seem to have fallen more rapidly at Associated, too.

As always, however, there’s a sting in the tail. Readers have stopped buying newspapers during this recession in big numbers.

Between July and December alone, the number of national newspapers sold by Trinity Mirror declined by up to 10%.

Trinity Mirror mitigated these big declines by hiking cover prices. During 2009, the Daily Mirror rose from 40p to 45p, and the Daily Record from 60p to 65p.

But if readers’ willingness to buy newspapers continues to decline at the current rate, an awkward question presents itself.

In a world where the Daily Mail costs 50p and the Sun costs anywhere between 20p and 35p, what’s the most that Sly Bailey can charge for a copy of the Daily Mirror?

Manchester Evening News: Did GMG invest in “things that matter”?

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 11 February 2010 at 15:39
Tags: Guardian Media Group, Media, Trinity Mirror

Over at t’other place, newsquestslave casts a critical eye on yesterday’s post comparing GMG and Trinity Mirror as owners of the Manchester Evening News.

(S)he takes issue with my suggestion that GMG invested steadily in its regionals during the late noughties, even as revenues and profits declined.

1) Operating expenditure isn’t everything

I looked at GMG’s track record in terms of operating costs (wages, rent, print contracts etc). But newsquestslave suggests another dimension:

“There is no ‘investment’ as in new capital raised from shareholders - as there hasn’t been anywhere in the regional press for decades.”

The argument seems to be that GMG’s regionals were just as bad as everyone else in this respect.

But newspaper companies generate lots of cash: this is one of the reasons so few have gone bust during the recession. It’s very rare indeed for them to ask shareholders for additional capital. Johnston Press did it in extreme circumstances, to pay off debts. But elsewhere, even the huge investment in new printing presses that’s taken place in recent years has been financed out of cash flow and debt.

In any event, you’d be hard-pressed to locate shareholders who would hand over new capital to finance operating expenditure (in the form of money to hire more journalists, for example).

On this basis, criticising newspaper companies for not raising more capital from shareholders is a red herring.

By looking at operating costs, I was trying to narrow the focus to factors that affect the quality of journalism on a day-to-day basis. It still think this is a valid way of looking at GMG’s track record as a regional newspaper proprietor.

2) What did GMG’s regionals spend all that money on?

Here, newsquestslave offers two arguments:

Given that things like newsprint have gone up in price, and that GMG regional has squandered cash on the Channel M disaster and other ego projects the investment/spending in the things that matter to newspaper readers, ie newspaper editorial, have declined sharply.

On “disaster/ego projects”: yep, it’s certainly possible that GMG chose to spend money on the wrong things. Yesterday, I suggested that this might have been the case. Of course, lots of companies do this. It’s called risk-taking. The question is whether GMG took more risks, or worse risks, for longer than its rivals.

On paper costs, Newsquestslave has a point. Buying paper accounts for 15%-20% of costs at a typical newspaper. So even though GMG maintained operational expenditure between 2004-2009, the rising cost of newsprint probably did squeeze out some investment in journalism at GMG’s regionals. Yet rising paper costs were a common factor for everyone.

That said, Newsquestslave’s points did make me backtrack on the numbers I dug out yesterday. I wanted to see whether I could reinforce my argument.

So today, I’ve got two graphs for you. The first is identical to yesterday’s effort. It shows how operating costs remained fairly static at GMG’s regionals as profit (and revenues) declined between 2004 and 2009.

The second graph shows how Trinity Mirror’s managers responded to declining profitability in a very different way. Trinity Mirror squeezed operating costs in a way that GMG simply didn’t, or couldn’t. On this basis, I stand by the suggestion I made yesterday:

GMG’s exit from the market is worrying for anyone who believes that sustained investment by large companies with deep pockets is the only thing that will save local journalism. The numbers suggest that GMG has been there, done that — and met with little or no success. The notion isn’t yet dead: but it has sustained serious damage.

As I hinted earlier, there’s one proviso. Did GMG’s regionals take too many risks? If more had been invested in “newspaper editorial”, and less on peripheral projects, would things have turned out differently?

Could the Manchester Evening News have remained a viable part of Guardian Media Group? Was Channel M responsible for that not happening? Some, including AndrewT23at Media Guardian, have suggested that this was the case:

As for GMG having to support a regional title, the MEN is still very capable of making money, even for a cash sieve like the Guardian, but saddling it with the basketcase TV channel that is Channel M was just too much.

If you look around the MEN newsroom at present you can see the damage caused by making a profitable regional newspaper prop up a vanity project TV station and, indeed, The (non Manchester or Northern) Guardian.

If you’ve got a view, leave a comment below, or send me a suitably anonymous email here:mediamonied@googlemail.com

Footnote: On the Trinity Mirror graphs, you’ll note a few asterisks. For the detail-oriented among you, here’s what they mean:

* = adjusted retained businesses

** = operating costs assumption for 2009 = 2 x 1H09 operating costs (reality will be lower).

GMG & The Manchester Evening News: “C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre”

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 10 February 2010 at 13:19
Tags: Guardian Media Group, Media, Trinity Mirror

A few kind souls at Hold The Front Page are predicting what awaits employees of Guardian Media Group who will soon start working for Trinity Mirror:

“For those who thought [GMG Regional Media chief executive Mark] Dodson was a ruthless hatchet man, you ain’t seen nothing yet…”

“God help them….If they think they’ve been squeezed in the past, wait til TM get their mitts on them, then they will understand that it is possible to get blood out of a stone.”

Among other things, the perception that GMG’s regionals have already been “squeezed” by a “hatchet man” feeds into the suggestion that the Manchester Evening News and its stablemates have been plundered relentlessly to sustain outsized losses at the Guardian and the Observer.

Ratcheting up the rhetoric a notch or two, Ian King, at the Times, even suggests that “for many MEN staffers, the new owners could scarcely be worse than the old ones”.

The news coverage certainly suggests that cost cutting became endemic at GMG’s regionals during the late noughties. Disputes over job losses flared up repeatedly as revenues declined: in 2006, 2007 and again in 2009.

Yet the numbers in GMG’s annual reports suggest a different picture. Remarkably, GMG held operating costs at its regional newspapers static between 2004 and 2009. Year after year, as revenues and profits declined, GMG carried on ploughing the same amount — more than £100m a year — into reporting, presenting and distributing the news at its regionals.

The contrast between steady investment and the downward trajectory of operating profits during the same period is painful. (In the graph accompanying this piece, I’ve rebased both sets of numbers to 100 as of 2004 to make comparison easier).

GMG’s exit from the market is worrying for anyone who believes that sustained investment by large companies with deep pockets is the only thing that will save local journalism. The numbers suggest that GMG has been there, done that — and met with little or no success. The notion isn’t yet dead: but it has sustained serious damage.

Did GMG simply invest in the wrong stuff? Or were GMG’s regional journalists living in a relative paradise? I suspect that the commenters at HTFP are probably closer to the truth than the deputy business editor of the Times. Working for Trinity Mirror will be a whole lot different.

Bosquet, the French general, famously described the charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava in 1854 in the following terms: “C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre”.

No doubt Sly Bailey, the chief executive of Trinity Mirror, thinks similarly about GMG’s recent track record as regional newspaper proprietor.

£7m for the Manchester Evening News: Carolyn McCall isn’t related to the Barclay brothers

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 10 February 2010 at 01:17
Tags: Guardian Media Group, Johnston Press, Trinity Mirror

For most Britons, the Blair-Brown boom reached a peak in early 2008. Yet as always, the news business was ahead of the game. For most publishers, revenues hit an all-time high during 2004-2005.

One deal, in particular, signalled that we had reached the peak.

In December 2005, Johnston Press bought Scotsman Publications from the Barclay brothers for £160m. This astonishing sum represented 2.5 times the revenue generated by The Scotsman, Scotland On Sunday and the Edinburgh Evening News during the previous year.

Half a decade later, what’s to be said about Guardian Media Group’s decision to sell its 32 local newspapers to Trinity Mirror?

If GMG had sold out to Johnston Press in 2005, it might have hoped for a price tag of over £300m (on the basis that its regionals generated revenues of £128m the previous year).

Today, however, GMG is selling its regionals for £7.4m in cash.

Some will criticise GMG for not persisting with its stricken cash cow. Others will allege an excess of sentimental attachment to the Manchester Evening News.

But let’s not get too aggressive, or too dewy-eyed. It’s worth remembering that GMG’s regionals delivered nearly £90m in operating profits between 2005 and 2008. If we’re going to compare today’s thin-looking deal with what might have been possible in 2005, we’ll need to make allowances for that £90m.

In addition, as part of today’s deal, GMG finds itself relieved of the contractual need to pay £37.4m to Trinity Mirror to print the Manchester Evening News.

This represents a real-world benefit for GMG, which continues to eat through its cash reserves in a manner that calls to mind Morgan Spurlock consuming Quarter Pounders in Super Size Me.

So add it all up: in total, GMG has made a return during the past five years of something like one times its regional newspapers’ current annual revenues (and more if you make allowances for not having to pay MEN’s print bill in the future).

This isn’t the kind of coup that will see the board of GMG elected to the deal-makers’ hall of fame alongside David and Frederick Barclay. But it isn’t that bad, either.

Panic or logic: Selling off the Manchester Evening News

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 18 December 2009 at 12:50
Tags: Guardian Media Group, Trinity Mirror

In itself, GMG’s effort to sell its regional newspapers to Trinity Mirror isn’t surprising. The timing is interesting, though.

Only a few weeks ago, sources at GMG played down the chances of selling off the Manchester Evening News in the near term. My assumption was that a sale would have to wait until economic recovery took hold. But now we’re looking at “exploratory talks”. It’s easy to interpret this as a distress signal on GMG’s part.

In this respect, the Daily Telegraph didn’t disappoint yesterday.

Any disposal would amount to a fire sale because it is thought that GMG Regional would fetch less than £40m. Before the collapse in newspaper advertising, the Manchester Evening News alone was estimated to be worth about £200m.

Yes: but will the Manchester Evening News or GMG Regional Media ever be worth £200m again? If anyone believes this, I’ve yet to meet them.

Set aside the talk of a “fire sale” for a moment. At a deeper level, there’s some logic, rather then panic, in this potential deal.

If, like GMG, you’ve already made the decision to get out of regional publishing, now might not be a bad time to sell. The run-up in newspaper valuations has reached a plateau. The prospect of a double dip recession looms.

Remember, too, that GMG’s regionals are a sub-scale operation. The economies of scale being generated by Trinity Mirror are the only source of profits in a declining market. Even if GMG pours management time into its regionals, it won’t be able to catch up.

Perhaps, too, it’s better to sell small assets as consolidation kicks off. The alternative involves the risk that you’ll be left behind when the serious horse-trading begins.

A window of opportunity may well have opened on Trinity Mirror’s side. For a long time, Sly Bailey has looked like the only regional publisher with the wherewithal to initiate consolidation.

Plainly, however, Trinity Mirror has been fretting about the attitude of the Office of Fair Trading. The review of newspaper competition rules initiated by Lord Carter and carried out by the OFT did little to calm its nerves.

Now, however, the election of a new government is only months away. The Cameroons will take a more relaxed view of consolidation.

The City is increasingly impressed with Trinity Mirror’s Terminator-style cost-cutting. Investors might cut Sly Bailey some slack if it can beat GMG down on price.

This vision of jigsaw pieces falling into place with slick precision is tempting. But let’s not get too carried away.

GMG’s situation is tricky. Pre-tax losses at GMG reached £90m in the year to March 2009, and the company will deliver another terrible set of results this year. The company’s cash cushion has started to look uncomfortably thin.

But GMG’s situation isn’t all bad. It has tiny debts, and could raise cash from banks or investors on a temporary basis if required. Emap has its problems, but it’s too early to suggest that GMG won’t get a return on the £300m it invested there 18 months ago.

The Telegraph is within its rights to call this a fire sale. Yet GMG doesn’t need to sell at any price, even if Trinity Mirror appears to be the only interested party.

In deals, it’s the future, rather than the past, that matters. Companies are valued on a multiple of their likely future profits, discounted for inflation. If the value of GMG Regional Media continues to fall during the next decade, selling up for £40m in 2010 could come to be viewed as a smart move.

This is the possibility that should haunt local journalists everywhere. The emotions that stalked local newsrooms when DMGT tried to offload Northcliffe in 2005 are in play once again.

The silver lining, if there is one, lies in the opportunities that will be created by further consolidation. Cost-conscious bosses working at 10,000 feet create organisations in their own image. In the chinks and voids around the footprints of the last remaining giants, new business models will emerge — eventually.

Guardian News & Media: Not that far out of line with the market, after all

Posted by Peter Kirwan on 18 November 2009 at 15:34
Tags: Daily Mail & General Trust, Guardian Media Group, Trinity Mirror

Did 25% of Guardian News & Media’s revenue base really disappear into thin air between April and September?

Last week, the Guardian itself left the door open to this interpretation. The Times appeared to confirm it, suggesting that revenues at the Guardian and the Observer had declined by £33m since April.

The contextual maths are unpleasant. In its last financial year, which finished in March, GNM generated revenues of £253m. For April-September 2008, it’s reasonable to assume that it generated half as much: say around £126m. A revenue decline of £33m during the same period in 2009 would have represented a fall of 26%.

Worse than anticipated? This would have been stunningly bad. Consider the following comparatives for total revenues (not just advertising revenues):

Trinity Mirror

– January-June: -17%
– 1st July-25th October: -12%

Independent News & Media

– January-June: -15% (in constant currency)

Associated Press

– March-June: -12% (underlying YOY figure, excluding Evening Standard)

Comparisons like these suggest that GNM’s revenue declines for April-September should be running at around the mid-teens in percentage terms.

As it turns out, that’s exactly what’s happening. A spokesperson for GMG tells me that the £33m YOY decline was a projection for GNM’s financial year as a whole — not for the six months between April and September.

On that basis, GNM should find itself 13% down on last year when its financial year comes to an end next March.

Worse than anticipated? Perhaps. But only slightly. Declines of this scale are not far off what the company was predicting last summer.

That said, GNM’s results for 2009-2010 — due to be unveiled next summer — could be the ugliest of the down cycle.

So far, GNM has cut £25m out of its cost base against 2008-2009. More cuts are on the way. But continuing revenue declines will punch another big hole in cashflow. On top of that, there’s the prospective impact of redundancy costs (these might be exceptional costs, but they represent real cash payments, unlike the notional write-downs in asset values that have become endemic among media companies).

Earlier this year, GMG’s chief executive Carolyn McCall outlined her timetable for turning around the group’s losses. “Can we afford it this year?” she asked. “Yes, but can we afford it for the next three years? No.”

The evidence suggests that McCall is on schedule. 2009-2010 won’t be a pleasant experience for GNM, but it won’t be anywhere near as bad as last week’s stories implied. By contrast, 2010-2011 should be a whole lot better.